



The US-Israel Iran war and the IMEC - Geopolitical and Economic Analysis

Published, and data current as at, 2026-03-16.

Independent research prepared for informational purposes. Generic in nature, not tailored to any reader's circumstances, and not investment advice. Methodology, conflicts of interest, and full disclosures appear at the end of this document.

1. Historical Context

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) conceptually descends from historical transcontinental routes like the Silk Roads and Spice Routes, which historically functioned as highly developed Afro-Eurasian trade networks.^{[1][2]} Historically, geopolitical fragmentation or conflicts severely disrupted these economic structures, causing transit bottlenecks.^[2] In modern terms, IMEC reinvents the Spice Route, technologically bridging India, the Arabian Gulf, and Europe to bypass maritime chokepoints.^[1] Structurally, it scales concepts similar to the Hejaz Railway and Israel's "Tracks for Regional Peace."^[3] Strategically, it challenges China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), proposing a decentralized framework driven by private capital instead of state monopolies.^{[1][4]}

2. Conception, Key Actors, and Strategic Interests

Conceived at the September 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi under the PGII, IMEC united the US, India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, European powers, and the EU.^{[5][3]} Each founding actor pursues strategic imperatives:

- **India:** Circumvents Chinese and Pakistani bottlenecks linking its manufacturing base directly to Europe and the Gulf via multi-modal transport.^{[4][1][6]}
- **The United States:** Views IMEC as a transparent alternative to the BRI, simultaneously preventing Chinese hegemony over Middle Eastern infrastructure and acting to cement Israel's regional integration.^{[4][7]}
- **The European Union:** Demands resilient green energy alternatives and secure supply chains outside of Russian gas dependence and Suez vulnerabilities.^{[8][3]}
- **The Gulf States:** Seek essential post-oil economic diversification by anchoring intercontinental logistics hubs while hedging away from exclusive Chinese dependence.^{[9][4]}

Furthermore, IMEC bypasses vulnerabilities tied to the Russian and Iranian-controlled INSTC.^{[9][10]}

3. Geopolitical Alignment and Participation

Spanning 6,400km, the corridor bypasses hostile transit regimes.^[11]

Categorization	State Actors	Geopolitical Status
----------------	--------------	---------------------


Committed	USA, India, UAE, Saudi Arabia, EU, France, Germany, Italy	Signatories actively securing funding frameworks and digital partnerships. ^[5]
Pending / Undecided	Israel, Jordan, Greece, Cyprus, Lebanon	Essential components facing integration delays from regional conflicts or economic challenges. ^{[3][9][12]}
Opposed / Excluded	Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Russia, China	Geopolitical monopolies facing direct financial and strategic bypass. ^{[13][9][10]}

By establishing stable terrestrial overland links, IMEC actively neutralizes asymmetric maritime threats (e.g., Houthis) at established maritime chokepoints.^{[8][14]}

4. Significance and Global Impact

IMEC represents a structural revolution in Afro-Eurasian trade times, potentially accelerating the India-to-Europe route by 40-50% while slashing UAE-Israel transit to mere days.^[3] Accelerating velocity optimizes inventory holding costs, vastly benefiting semiconductor, electronics, and agricultural industries.^[3]

IMEC: Redefining the Global Trade Architecture



IMEC merges logistical paths with transcontinental electricity grids, fiber optic cables, and clean hydrogen pipelines, becoming a core technology architecture rather than just freight transportation.^[5] Geopolitically, it creates collective security protocols. Binding Arab nations and Israel reduces the opportunity costs of conflict.^{[15][4][13]}

5. Financial Architecture and Market Impact

Constructing massive transcontinental capital investments requires merging sovereign geopolitical frameworks with aggressive private market mobilization.^[6] Multilaterally, the EU employs Macro-Financial Assistance strategies, notably a €500 million package to Jordan, while US commitments under PGII seek to mitigate early investment risk.^{[15][16][5]} Gulf sovereign funds actively subsidize rail expansions.^[6]

In private capacities, players like ACWA Power secure green hydrogen positions, while India's

Adani Group executed key maritime investments capturing Israel's Haifa Port and partnering with Marseille Fos.^{[17][11][15][12]} Economically, generating annual transit throughputs up to 3 million TEUs projects substantial transit revenue streams.^[11] Furthermore, unified energy architecture actively lowers grid costs,^[6] while new data pipelines guarantee long-term communication sovereignty against Chinese infrastructure.^[18]

6. The Abraham Accords and Pre-War Diplomatic Architecture

The foundational diplomatic achievement making IMEC physically possible was the 2020 Abraham Accords, which initiated regional integration against common threats like Iran.^{[19][3]} This was continually expanded by the Biden administration toward a grand trilateral agreement targeting Saudi-Israeli normalization, actively supported by US strategic security guarantees and defense cooperation.^{[20][21][22][23]} Consequently, the public operationalization of IMEC announced at the G20 profoundly threatened Iranian regional leverage which required Arab-Israeli alienation.^[24]

7. October 7th as a Catalyst for Paradigm Shift

Calculated explicitly as a massive strategic disruptor targeting the impending normalization architectures, Hamas initiated the October 7th attacks. Intelligence obtained from Yahya Sinwar established the goal to aggressively stall the IMEC momentum.^{[24][21]} Although successful in freezing short-term Saudi diplomatic integration, the attacks fundamentally forced Israel to abandon temporary containment policies, shifting instead to systematic elimination protocols of Iran's proxy architecture.^{[24][25]}

8. Security Risks, Conflict Dynamics, and The Proxy Network Collapse

The Red Sea conflict clearly validated IMEC's essential design—a reliable overland architecture completely bypassing vulnerable maritime zones like the Bab el-Mandeb strait which suffered severe economic disruption from Houthi aggression.^{[14][8]} Israel systematically destroyed proxy architecture across the region:

Timeline	Targeted Proxy / Region	Mechanism of Dismantling
2024	Hamas (Gaza)	Total destruction of military capacity. ^[24]
Sep-Nov 2024	Hezbollah (Lebanon)	Decapitation of leadership and destruction of precision and short-range assets. ^[24]

Dec 2024	Assad Regime (Syria)	Dismantling of internal control regimes, breaking key logistical land-bridges linking the IRGC to Lebanon. ^[24]
2025-2026	PMF (Iraq)	Aggressive aerial degradation combined with systemic FATF illicit funding interdictions. ^[26]

Eliminating Hezbollah protects the Adani Group's Haifa Port investments,^{[25][27]} and clearing Iraqi borders safely anchors Jordanian investments.^[8]

9. Impact of Regime Change on IMEC's Success and Financial Viability

The potential removal of the IRGC architecture drastically recalculates geopolitical modeling. The unprecedented 2026 "Operation Epic Fury" severely disabled Iran's structural capacities and military foundations, creating a massive short-term crude market shock reaching \$130 per barrel.^{[25][28][29]}

However, the eradication of the Iranian regime represents an enormous peace dividend over the long term, permanently removing saboteur threats across the Gulf and effectively lowering insurance premiums.^[30] Conversely, releasing unsanctioned Iranian crude creates an extreme price competitiveness dynamic.^[30] Without European tariffs (CBAM) or subsidies, cheap Iranian oil severely challenges the economic sustainability of IMEC's capital-intensive green hydrogen operations.^[6]

10. Disruption of Anti-IMEC Coalitions and Competitors

IRGC disintegration profoundly degrades hostile corridor implementations.^[9]

Competing Initiative	Primary Backer	Strategic Impact of Iranian Regime Change
INSTC	Russia	Relies absolutely on Iranian integration. ^[9] The collapse of Tehran leaves Moscow geographically isolated from southern trade routes. ^[9]
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)	China	A \$400B strategic partnership banking on IRGC support becomes irrelevant if an integrated Iran pivots west. ^[31]
Development Road Project (DRP)	Turkey	Turkey originally designed the DRP to contest both IMEC and Iranian domination in Iraq. ^{[10][32]}

China will inevitably face difficult strategic adjustments if forced to leverage secondary non-

Gulf routes or engage directly with democratic regimes.^{[31][33]} Meanwhile, Turkey's DRP, losing its Iranian boogeyman, will likely merge into the Western logistical frameworks as to prevent terminal irrelevancy.^[34]

11. Technological and Energy Integration

Digital independence significantly reinforces IMEC infrastructure. Moving away from Chinese-controlled lines like PEACE, IMEC leverages massive Google and Telecom Italia architectures.^{[11][18]} The Blue-Raman submarine cables integrate France, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and India using a 16 fiber optic pairing model handling upwards of 25 Tbps per channel.^{[35][36]} The strategic bypass of Egypt enables high-frequency tech ecosystems previously extremely vulnerable to adversarial disruptions.^[11]

Clean energy transfers combine directly with the European Hydrogen Bank's early off-take mechanisms, rapidly bridging power models pushed by companies like Masdar and ACWA Power into secure grid architectures.^{[11][37][13][6]}

12. Logistical and Regulatory Feasibility

However, IMEC confronts extensive bureaucratic frictions regarding multi-modal customs.^[38] The introduction of Master Application for International Trade and Regulatory Interface (MAITRI) architectures ensures transparent, real-time Virtual Trade Corridors between India and the UAE.^[38] By rapidly enforcing standard Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and leveraging African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) digital protocols, transit times avoid border constraints.^{[38][39]} Success solely dictates closing physical double-tracking rail links binding the Saudi and Jordanian rail lines to the Mediterranean effectively while managing digital frameworks concurrently.^{[11][5][3]}

References

1. Silk Road vs Spice Route: IMEC and its Implications - Modern Diplomacy, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/09/17/silk-road-vs-spice-route-imec-and-its-implications/>
2. Trade and Political Fragmentation on the Silk Roads: The Economic Effects of Historical Exchange between China and the Muslim East - Lisa Blaydes, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://blaydes.people.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj24621/files/media/file/silk2.pdf>
3. The India - Middle East - Europe Economic Corridor: - Konrad ..., accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.kas.de/documents/263458/263507/IMEC+publication+ENG.pdf/4568ca66-aaa4-3961-d59f-c9d7d23b8191?version=1.0&t=1751282626770>

4. (PDF) A New Dimension of Strategic Rivalry in the Middle East: A ..., accessed March 16, 2026, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/399151931_A_New_Dimension_of_Strategic_Rivalry_in_the_Middle_East_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_the_Development_Road_and_The_India-Middle_East-Europe_Economic_Corridor_IMEC
5. Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor - Wikisource, the free online library, accessed March 16, 2026, https://he.wikisource.org/wiki/en:Memorandum_of_Understanding_on_the_Principles_of_an_India-Middle_East-Europe_Economic_Corridor
6. IMEC: A Blueprint for Transcontinental Energy Integration - Observer Research Foundation, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/imec-a-blueprint-for-transcontinental-energy-integration>
7. Enabling a Better Offer: How Does the West Counter Belt and Road? - CSIS, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/enabling-better-offer-how-does-west-counter-belt-and-road>
8. IMEC's Ambitious Gamble: Overcoming Geopolitical Obstacles in a Fractured Mediterranean, accessed March 16, 2026, https://mecouncil.org/publication_chapters/imecs-ambitious-gamble-overcoming-geopolitical-obstacles-in-a-fractured-mediterranean/
9. Corridor Diplomacy and Regional Agency: The Middle East between China and India, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publications/center-publications/publication-article/detail/corridor-diplomacy-and-regional-agency--the-middle-east-between-china-and-india>
10. Iran's geoeconomic positioning since 1979: Across all Azimuts | Clingendael, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/irans-geoeconomic-positioning-1979-across-all-azimuts>
11. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor - Atlantic Council, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/The-India-Middle-East-Europe-Economic-Corridor-Connectivity-in-an-era-of-geopolitical-uncertainty.pdf>
12. Macron Pushes IMEC Corridor via Mumbai–Beirut–Haifa–Marseille as Path to End War | Rafi Glick - The Blogs, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/macron-pushes-imec-corridor-via-mumbai-beirut-haifa-marseille-as-path-to-end-war/>
13. Our New Path to Peace for the "Day After": The IMEC Peace Triangle, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://ecopeaceme.org/2025/07/16/our-new-path-to-sustainability-the-imec-peace-triangle/>

14. Red Sea Uncertainty: A 2026 Forecast for the Houthis Actions ..., accessed March 16, 2026, <https://globalsecurityreview.com/red-sea-uncertainty-a-2026-forecast-for-the-houthis-actions/>
15. IMEC's Comeback | German Marshall Fund of the United States, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.gmfus.org/news/imecs-comeback>
16. EU and Jordan deepen partnership with first-ever Summit - Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, accessed March 16, 2026, https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-jordan-deepen-partnership-first-ever-summit-2026-01-08_en
17. India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.imec.international/>
18. Reshaping the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor: New Challenges, Old Vulnerabilities - TRENDS Research & Advisory, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://trendsresearch.org/insight/reshaping-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-new-challenges-old-vulnerabilities/>
19. The Gulf States' regional role after October 7th - Aspenia Online, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://aspeniaonline.it/the-gulf-states-regional-role-after-october-7th/>
20. The Abraham Accords - Middle East Institute, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://mei.edu/backgrounder/abraham-accords/>
21. Hamas document shows Oct. 7 attack aimed at derailing Saudi normalization - report, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-document-shows-oct-7-attack-aimed-at-derailing-saudi-normalization-report/>
22. A US–Saudi deal deserves its own scrutiny, regardless of Israeli ..., accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/us-saudi-deal-deserves-its-own-scrutiny-regardless-israeli-normalization>
23. The Saudi-Israeli Normalization Gambit: Deal or No Deal? - Arab Center Washington DC, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-saudi-israeli-normalization-gambit-deal-or-no-deal/>
24. The Long Global Shadow of October 7 | German Marshall Fund of the United States, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.gmfus.org/news/long-global-shadow-october-7>
25. Fracturing the Axis: Degrading and Disrupting Iran's Proxy ... - INSS, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Fracturing-the-Axis-Degrading-and-Disrupting-Irans-Proxy-Network.pdf>
26. We Bombed the Wrong Target Iran's Proxy Network Strategy - Irregular Warfare Initiative,

- accessed March 16, 2026, <https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/iran-proxy-network-strategy/>
27. Adani Ports Confirms Haifa Port Safe And Fully Operational Amid Israel Conflict Escalation | NewsX - YouTube, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uAJpdE-vnGo>
28. The global price tag of war in the Middle East - The World Economic Forum, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/03/the-global-price-tag-of-war-in-the-middle-east/>
29. Economic impact of the 2026 Iran war - Wikipedia, accessed March 16, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_impact_of_the_2026_Iran_war
30. If Iran changes, the region's economy would change with it | Iran International, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601196037>
31. China Bet Its Middle East Strategy on Iran. That Bet Has Failed. | Hudson Institute, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/china-bet-its-middle-east-strategy-iran-bet-has-failed-miles-yu>
32. What Iran Stands to Lose from Iraq's Development Road Megaproject - Gulf International Forum, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://gulrif.org/what-iran-stands-to-lose-from-iraqs-development-road-megaproject/>
33. Findings | China's Belt and Road: Implications for the United States - CFR.org, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.cfr.org/task-force-reports/chinas-belt-and-road-implications-for-the-united-states/findings>
34. Two competing trade visions in the Middle East united by ambition - Control Risks, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.controlrisks.com/our-thinking/insights/two-competing-trade-visions-in-the-middle-east-united-by-ambition>
35. Blue-Raman - Submarine Networks, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/systems/asia-europe-africa/blue-raman>
36. Announcing the Blue and Raman subsea cable systems | Google Cloud Blog, accessed March 16, 2026, <https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/infrastructure/announcing-the-blue-and-raman-subsea-cable-systems>
37. Webinar on the EU Hydrogen Mechanism's offtake collection - Energy - European Union, accessed March 16, 2026, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/events/webinar-eu-hydrogen-mechanisms-offtake-collection-2026-01-27_en
38. IMEC must be more than a trade route. Digital integration should be ..., accessed March 16, 2026, <https://n7initiative.org/research/imec-must-be-more-than-a-trade-route-digital-integration-should-be-a-priority/>

39. The AfCFTA digital Trade Protocol : Market access for digital products and institutional requirements - Indico, accessed March 16, 2026, https://indico.un.org/event/1020893/attachments/24248/69081/1st%20UNECA_Module%202_Legal%20&%20Institutional%20Foundations_EN.pdf

Author Certification

The analytical frame, argument structure, source selection, and conclusions in this report are my own. They accurately reflect my views as at the date of publication. No part of my compensation is, was, or will be tied to the specific conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report.

Automated and AI-assisted tools are used for source retrieval and drafting support, under my direction and against a structure I define. No claim appears in this report on the authority of an automated tool. All load-bearing claims are verified against primary sources before publication.

Peter P. Lupo

Methodology

Structure of analysis. Reports begin from a structural hypothesis drawn from prior domain and historical knowledge, which is then tested against primary sources. Analysis proceeds through a curated sequence — observation, foundation, argument, counter-argument, consolidation, conclusion — with a dedicated adversarial stage in which the emerging thesis is argued against before it is consolidated. A second sourcing pass supports the conclusions reached. Each report states the conditions that would falsify it.

Use of precedent. Where a genuine structural precedent exists, it is used to generate the analytical frame. Where a comparison serves only to illustrate a point already established, it is identified as illustrative. Where no useful precedent exists, analysis is built forward from observable mechanics. Comparisons are not introduced to satisfy a format expectation.

Sourcing standard. Primary sources are preferred — regulatory filings, government budget documents, company disclosures, and named academic and institutional research. Where sources conflict, the conflict is disclosed and the range presented rather than resolved in favour of the more convenient figure. Figures whose provenance cannot be established are excluded.

Verification. Every numeric claim, named program, institution, and dated catalyst is checked against its cited source prior to publication. Claims that cannot be verified are removed rather than hedged.

Currency and supersession. Analysis in this report is current as at the date shown. Structural conclusions are intended to remain valid beyond that date; market data, valuations, funding events, and catalyst timing are not, and are superseded by subsequent Position Updates for this coverage area.

Conflicts of Interest and Positions

What this section covers. Forecortex discloses relationships in which the author's economic interests are tied to the investment decisions of readers, or to the subject matter of a report. Ordinary commercial terms between Forecortex and its subscribers are not disclosed and do not create such a tie.

Trading and positions. The author actively trades public securities on a technical and systematic basis, independently of Forecortex research. Forecortex reports may express views on publicly traded companies; those views are general in nature, are not tailored to any reader, and are not directed to any individual. The author may hold, acquire, or dispose of long or short positions in any public company referenced in this report at any time, including before and after publication. Individual public-market positions are not itemized on a per-report basis.

Private interests. Where the author holds a direct or indirect interest in a privately held company discussed in this report, it is disclosed at forecortex.com/disclosures, together with the date the interest was acquired. That record is a dated, append-only log of the author's disclosed interests as at the publication date of each report. Entries are added but never removed, so the disclosure applicable to any report remains available.

Timing of positions. The author does not initiate or close any position in anticipation of publication. Where the author holds an interest in a privately held company discussed in a report, the date that interest was acquired is disclosed alongside it. Forecortex does not publish analysis of a privately held company while the author is participating in an open financing round in that company. Published reports are not amended to reflect events after their publication date.

Fund relationships. The author is an investor in one or more private investment funds with exposure to sectors covered by Forecortex research. The author provides informal analysis to one such fund and receives compensation for it. The author does not control the investment decisions of any such fund, and no such fund exercises editorial control over Forecortex publications, reviews them prior to release, or directs their subject matter. Known holdings of

such funds in companies covered by Forecortex research, where the author is aware of them, are disclosed at [forecortex.com/disclosures](https://www.forecortex.com/disclosures).

Commissioned work. Some Forecortex reports are generalized versions of work originally commissioned by a client. The origin of this report is stated in the notice at the front of this document. Forecortex clients have no editorial control over the conclusions of commissioned work and do not review generalized publications prior to release.

No issuer compensation. Forecortex does not accept compensation, securities, or other consideration from any company, issuer, or fund in exchange for coverage. No entity discussed in this report has paid for its inclusion.

No pre-publication review. No company, issuer, or fund discussed in this report reviewed it prior to publication.

Nature of This Publication

Forecortex publishes independent research and commentary of general application. Its reports are prepared for a general readership, are not tailored to the circumstances, objectives, financial situation, or risk tolerance of any reader, and do not take any reader's particular position into account.

Forecortex is not registered as an adviser, dealer, or investment fund manager in any jurisdiction, and does not provide personalized investment advice, portfolio management, or recommendations directed to any individual reader. Nothing in this document creates an advisory or fiduciary relationship between Forecortex and any reader.

Nothing in this document constitutes an offer to buy or sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell, any security.

Forward-Looking Statements

Projections, timelines, scenarios, and threshold conditions in this report represent probabilistic analysis, not predictions of outcome. The systems analysed — capital markets, technology development, industrial capacity, and policy — are complex, adaptive, and subject to intervention. Actual trajectories may differ materially as a result of policy changes,

technological developments, competitive responses, or geopolitical events not foreseeable at the date of publication.

This report is an analytical framework for scenario assessment. It is not a forecast, and no outcome discussed should be treated as expected.

Political Neutrality and Policy Analysis

Forecortex maintains political neutrality. This document does not endorse, criticize, or assess the ideological merits of any political party, administration, government, or public figure. Analysis of policy is confined to its structural, economic, and capital-allocation effects.

References to specific legislation, appropriations, regulatory actions, trade measures, or government programs are included solely to assess their observable effects on markets, capital flows, industrial capacity, and competitive position.

Reader Responsibility

Personal responsibility. All investment decisions are the sole responsibility of the reader.

Professional advice required. This document is not a substitute for advice from a licensed investment professional. Readers should consult a qualified adviser regarding their own circumstances before making any investment decision.

No personalized advice. This analysis is not tailored to any reader's financial situation, objectives, or risk tolerance.

Risk of loss. All investment involves risk of loss, including total loss of capital.

Distribution, Licence, and Document Marking

Licence and permitted use. Each copy of this report is marked to identify its licensee, and the licence that applies is determined by that marking.

A copy marked with a firm name is licensed to that firm for internal use by its partners,

employees, and contractors. Redistribution outside the licensed firm — including to portfolio companies, limited partners, co-investors, or advisers — requires written consent.

A copy marked with an individual's name is licensed to that person for personal professional use. Redistribution is not permitted.

A copy marked "Forecortex" is publicly released and may be shared and quoted with attribution.

In all cases. Republication in full, resale, incorporation into a commercial product, and reproduction of tables or entity data require written consent. Brief quotation with attribution is permitted.

Corrections

Forecortex corrects errors of fact. Substantive corrections to a published report are noted in the document itself, dated, and described — corrections are not made silently. Where a correction materially affects an analytical conclusion, licensed recipients are notified and the correction is recorded in the next Position Update for the relevant coverage area.

Readers identifying an error are invited to report it to corrections@forecortex.com.

Contact and Publication Details

Forecortex Inc. Incorporated in Ontario, Canada. Contact: contact@forecortex.com

Published, and data current as at, 2026-03-16.